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Welfare State Reform and Political Allegiance1
 KEES VAN KERSBERGEN 
1. INTRODUCTION
Many theories have predicted the end of the welfare state, particularly pointing
to the formidable challenges and pressures that threaten its viability or even subsistence.
The challenges include population ageing, sluggish economic growth, long-term
unemployment, changing family structures, the transformation of life cycle patterns, the
post-industrialization of labour markets, the erosion of systems of interest intermediation
and collective bargaining, the rise of new risks and needs, and international pressures
(“globalization”). Still, so far the welfare state has continued to exist, albeit perhaps
functioning at a lower level of social and economic performance. Institutionalist
accounts of welfare state development have explicitly focused on institutional and policy
persistence and identiﬁed resistance against change as the most conspicuous characteristic
of welfare state development in the 1980s and 1990s. However, there are increasing
numbers of arguments and hypotheses that imply a qualiﬁcation of the resilience
argument, in general because there seem to be far more radical or fundamental changes
than expected or observed so far.2
Elsewhere, I have argued that the chances for survival of the welfare state may be
more gloomy than expected if the political debate over restructuring continues to
assume the inherent political and institutional mechanisms of resistance of the status
quo.3 In addition, a fundamental alteration in the traditional manner in which we tend
to think of the welfare state and a radical transformation of its institutions and core
policies seem necessary. If it is the case that because “(…) a major overhaul of the
existing welfare state ediﬁce must occur if it is meant to produce a positive-sum kind
of welfare for post-industrial society,”4 then the political mission is both immense and
paradoxical. The political and institutional defence mechanisms of the “old order” have
to be broken down, while at the same time new and innovative social and political
coalitions have to be forged that can initiate a “new order.” The immensity concerns
the fact that this has to be accomplished in such a way that the existing level of social
protection is guaranteed while at the same time the systems are reorganized. The
paradox is that in order to save the essential functions of the welfare state, it must be
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transformed in a radical manner. For such a thorough and major change, for instance
in the ﬁnancing of core schemes, political resources must be mobilized and support
must be found among those groups in society (voters, unions, client and other interest
groups, insurance companies, political parties, etc.) that adhere to the welfare state as it
currently stands.
Overlooking much of the recent literature, it strikes me that the issues of the
political conditions and consequences of radical welfare state reform have been
under-researched and perhaps taken too lightly. In fact, much of the resilience literature
explains the non-occurrence of far-reaching welfare state reform in terms of the absence
of a political opportunity structure conducive to radical reform. Still, reforms do take
place in the advanced welfare states, whether in the form of radical cutbacks, structural
adjustments or piecemeal retrenchment. The issue I would like to raise here concerns
the political consequences of reform in terms of the legitimacy of the political system of
which the welfare state is a structural part and the political allegiance it is capable of
engendering.
I assume that historically the favourable effects of the welfare state(s) on social and
economic security and well-being (including equality) have reinforced political integration
and have played a crucial role in the generation and maintenance of legitimacy and
political allegiance. Given the immensity and paradoxical nature of the necessity to
reform the welfare state radically precisely in order to save it and given that this political
mission is likely to corrode social and economic security and well-being, it becomes
increasingly important to ask whether and to what extent welfare state reform affects the
postulated positive linkage between the welfare state, legitimacy and political allegiance.
This paper, then, does not deal with welfare state retrenchment, austerity or
restructuring as possible elements of the “crisis” of the welfare state, that is to say the
topics with which much if not most welfare state research is currently preoccupied.
Rather, it seems to me increasingly appropriate to look at how changes in welfare state
conﬁgurations and social policies might affect the strictly political outcomes of the
welfare state, such as political integration, legitimacy, stability and allegiance. I cannot
present any coherent theory, hypotheses or research strategy yet, but would simply like
to argue in favour of paying more attention to these political issues by pointing to some
potential sources of inspiration for a change in the research agenda in this direction.
We need to understand better: (a) the contribution of the welfare state (or social
policies) to political integration, (the stability or instability of) legitimacy and allegiance;
and (b) the way in which welfare state reform affects the relation between the welfare
state and legitimacy and political allegiance. The general question that in my view
should assume a much more prominent place on the social science agenda is the
following: under what conditions and to what extent do the different reform strategies
of the welfare state weaken or strengthen favourable political feedback mechanisms that
affect legitimacy and political allegiance?
This paper is organized as follows. I think it is possible and necessary to learn from
contemporary welfare state research for understanding the political impact of welfare
state reform. A review of the literature for these purposes is offered in Section 2. Most
of the literature, however, deals with welfare state reform as the dependent variable, but
is not particularly precise in its conceptualization and operationalization. A proposal to
improve upon this state of affairs that has repercussions for how we can look at the
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welfare state as an independent variable explaining political outcomes is discussed in
Section 3. In Section 4 I propose to think of the welfare state as a crucial mechanism
linking a government to the general public. Social policies substantiate the social and
economic security and well-being of the population, thereby conﬁrming or reinforcing
political allegiance. In this section I also explain the analytical advantages of the concept
of “allegiance.” In the concluding Section 5 I will conﬁne myself to the presentation
of four general questions and possible routes for further research on the political effects
of welfare state reform.
2. THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF RADICAL REFORM5
As Green-Pedersen and Haverland rightly stress,6 the debate on retrenchment and
austerity, particularly since the publication of Paul Pierson’s instant classic on the topic,7
has been almost entirely a political science affair. Arguments on how to explain
retrenchment or the resilience of existing welfare regimes focus on “new” political
variables such as party systems, the logic of elections, political institutions, and policy
learning. The debate has focused on Pierson’s claim that the old politics of welfare state
growth are radically different from the new politics of austerity. The issue is whether
this implies that old theories of expansion are obsolete and unusable for explaining
retrenchment and ultimately also for understanding the political consequences of radical
welfare state reform.
Paul Pierson, who analyses retrenchment policies at the level of single pro-
grammes, has argued that “frontal assaults on the welfare state carry tremendous
electoral risks” and that retrenchment should not be misunderstood as the mirror image
of the growth of the welfare state.8 Welfare expansion usually generated a popular
politics of credit claiming for extending social rights and raising beneﬁts to an increasing
number of citizens, while austerity policies affront voters and networks of organized
interests. In other words, welfare state reform tends to induce political backlash and in
most of the recent literature this has been taken to explain the striking inertia of social
programmes. However, radical reforms are taking place and there seems to be a
growing awareness that such reforms are inevitable if the welfare state is to be kept.
Therefore, an important issue pertains to the type of political backlash that is to be
expected from radical reform.
The post-1945 welfare state has also produced an entirely novel institutional context.
Once welfare programmes, like social housing and health care, were solidly established,
they created their own programme-speciﬁc constituencies of clients and professional
interests. As a consequence, “the emergence of powerful groups surrounding social
programs may make the welfare state less dependent on the political parties, social
movements, and labour organizations that expanded social programs in the ﬁrst place.”9
Specialized social programmes in the policy areas of social housing, health care,
education, public assistance, social security, and labour market management have indeed
developed into institutionally separated and functionally differentiated policy domains.
Therefore, a general weakening of social democratic and Christian democratic parties
and the trade union movement—the main historical supporters of welfare state
expansion—need not translate into a commensurate weakening of social policy. I
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emphasize that the programme-speciﬁc constituencies of clients and professional inter-
ests have developed into powerful defenders of the welfare state, but that they are also
at the same time the main source of political controversies over reform.
The former “politics matters” researchers as well as those who adhered to the
“power resources approach”10 empirically corroborate the Pierson-thesis and conclude
that for austerity and retrenchment (public employment in Scandinavia is the exception)
traditional class and politics matter less and less, because an institutional rather than a
political logic governs the adaptation of welfare states. Myles and Quadagno argue that
because “old politics” in this sense matters less for welfare state adaptation, it makes
sense to turn to the ﬁrst, “pre-political” generation of research as a source of inspiration
for understanding current developments in welfare state restructuring.11 The “logic of
industrialism” approach, for instance, argued that the welfare state was by and large the
answer of society to the growing needs of its population. Industrialization created a
demand for welfare by destroying traditional bonds and the institutions providing social
security. The development of industrial society brought along economic growth,
urbanization, and demographic change.
Population ageing, one of the correlates of industrialization, has clearly been a
major factor governing recent welfare state retrenchment and restructuring. In this
sense, old theory is still relevant. However, as Myles and Quadagno correctly argue,12
current change is as much economic and social as it is demographic, if only because of
the existing massive institutional commitments to pensions. Post-industrial develop-
ment, too, has a whole set of new “correlates,” of which the increasing labour market
participation of women, changing family structures and declining fertility rates are the
most important ones. However, if anywhere it is clear that radical reform is already
taking place or is inevitable in the near future, it is in the area of old age pensions. And
if anywhere the possibility of a severe political backlash looms ahead, it is among
pensioners whose incomes are threatened and among those currently in the labour
market who are afraid of the coming burden of double contributions and fear
disentitlement once they retire.
Still, there is another way in which we can learn from the “logic of industrialism”
approach, which stressed that rapid economic growth created not only the need for
welfare state intervention, but also the resources to do so. Scarbrough stresses that trends
associated with industrial development (urbanization, individualization, changes
in family structures, increasing reliance on wage labour) are still paramount and
hence permanently reinforce needs or generate new demands.13 At the same time,
afﬂuence, continued (although slower) economic growth and the still considerable
administrative capacity of the state, still provide the resources and means for the welfare
state.
Scarbrough, as one of the few who has an open eye for political effects, also points
to the continued relevance of those theories that see the welfare state as an aspect of
modernization and development, especially nation-building. In her analysis, welfare
states are still appropriate elite strategies of social and political incorporation and
developments, such as internationalization, reinforce the threat of social exclusion. Her
conclusion is that there are “good grounds for the presumption that state intervention
to ensure some degree of security and equity among its citizens remains central to
societal cohesion and political order.”14 Therefore, if state intervention cannot guaran-
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tee security and equity among its citizens, societal cohesion and political order may be
in jeopardy.
In the spirit of the “industrialism” approach, one could also make the argument
that sluggish productivity growth and mass unemployment deteriorate the conditions
for the maintenance of the welfare state or its further expansion. Moreover, “post-indus-
trialization,” i.e. the employment shift (and the accompanying change in the occu-
pational structure) from manufacturing to services, reinforces slow productivity growth.
Both developments are likely to create an environment that is much more predisposed
to welfare and tax backlash, weakening the political support for the welfare state.
In Esping-Andersen’s analyses,15 post-industrialism leads to serious trade-offs,
particularly between protecting labour market insiders and creating opportunities for
outsiders and, more generally, between employment and equality. Iversen and Wren
even identify a post-industrial trilemma between budgetary restraint, wage equality and
employment growth, where only two of these three policy goals can be successfully
pursued simultaneously: “Because budgetary restraint precludes any rapid expansion of
public sector employment, governments wedded to such discipline must either accept
low earnings equality in order to spur growth in private service employment or face low
growth in overall employment. Alternatively, governments may pursue earnings equal-
ity and high employment, but they can do so only at the expense of budgetary
restraint.”16 One can imagine the increasing difﬁculties for governments, especially the
EU member states that need to adhere to the convergence criteria of EMU, to
legitimize their social and economic policies when they need to explain to the voters
that either rising equality or mass unemployment is a necessary consequence of
government policy.
Myles and Quadagno agree with the second generation of research (“politics
matters,” “power resources”) that in the post-war period cross-national variation in
welfare state development—under conditions of continuing industrial development—
could by and large be explained by the variation in class structure, class coalitions, the
strength of political parties and unions as well as by the institutional setting in which
these forces struggled.17 However, they follow researchers like Hicks, Stephens et al.,
Huber and Stephens, and Swank who argue that “politics matters” in a very different
way (or not at all) for how welfare states cope with post-industrialization and
globalization.18 As Myles and Quadagno put it: “Political accounts of the earlier period
of post-war expansion—the claim that politics matters—emphasized the role of political
actors (…). In contrast, explanations of refracted divergence during the last quarter
century—the variety of responses to globalization and post-industrialization—have
instead emphasized the decisive role of political institutions (…): thus the partisan
(left–right) composition of government matters less than the presence of corporatist
decision-making institutions.”19 If one reﬂects upon the consequences of this thesis for
a moment, one can anticipate that once the electorate itself realizes fully that “politics-
does-not-matter” latent anti-politics sentiments are activated and a fertile ground for
populist activists is likely to emerge.
In sum, those who argue that old theory that was designed to explain the
expansion of the welfare state cannot explain retrenchment frequently revert to old
theories that preceded the “politics matters” school, particularly the “logic of industri-
alism” approach and elite-oriented modernization (nation-building) theory, but also—
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although in this paper I will not elaborate upon this—Marxist analyses of the capitalist
state (this holds particularly for much of the globalization literature). However, they fail
to consider the potential and likely political effects of the “decline of traditional politics”
and the extent to which such political consequences of welfare state adaptation and
reform are likely to affect the conditions for welfare state survival.
3. THE SPECIFICATION OF WELFARE STATE REFORM: THE (IN)DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
There is considerable confusion around the question of what exactly is to be
explained. The problem is known as the “dependent variable problem.” What are
comparativists trying to explain? Is it the crisis or end of the welfare state? Is it
cross-national variation in the patterns of retrenchment? Is it the reconstruction of the
welfare state? Is it the persistence of welfare states? Is it the convergence of regimes?
Pierson observes that there is a lack of consensus on outcomes,20 particularly with
respect to the issue of how much welfare states have actually changed since the Golden
Age of growth, that is to say roughly since the 1980s. For instance, where Pierson looks
at social spending, particularly transfer payments, and concludes that there has been no
radical dismantling of welfare state arrangements,21 Clayton and Pontusson22 criticize
this thesis by pointing to the fact that if one looks at the organization of the public
sector, particularly the delivery of social services and the development of public
employment, one can observe signiﬁcant retrenchments and strongly market-oriented
reforms, even in the social democratic welfare state of Sweden. In fact, Clayton and
Pontusson go so far as to argue that current reforms (retrenchment) tend to have an
antiservice bias which is not picked up if one studies transfer payments. By contrast,
Levy23 ﬁnds that especially welfare state reform in Christian democratic regimes cannot
be described either in terms of pure retrenchments of transfer programmes or in terms
of an antiservice bias (if only because these welfare states are service-lean anyway). His
argument is that these welfare states “are not locked into zero-sum trade-offs between
the pursuit of efﬁciency and the pursuit of equity.”24 In fact, successful reform implies
turning vice into virtue, that is, “targeting inequities within the welfare system that are
simultaneously a source of inefﬁciency.”25
According to Pierson,26 the controversy over the dependent variable is ﬁrst of all
a result of the indistinctness of the concept of the welfare state itself. Too many and
quite divergent phenomena are discussed under the same heading. In other words,
contemporary welfare state research suffers from a weakness well known in comparative
politics: concept stretching. Related to this is the problem of which data to use for the
operationalization of “the welfare state.” Also, most theories so far are still based on the
analysis of data of the early 1990s, whereas the most signiﬁcant changes may be of more
recent date.27 Finally, Pierson also notices theoretical weaknesses that concern the
implicit assumption in many studies that one can measure welfare state change along a
single scale. There has been a tendency to reduce the problem of welfare state
retrenchment and reform to a dichotomy of “less” versus “more” and “intact” versus
“dismantled,” which is an unwarranted theoretical simpliﬁcation. He proposes to
emend this and improve our understanding of welfare state change by looking at three
dimensions:
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1. Recommodiﬁcation: the attempt “to restrict the alternatives to participation in the
labour market, either by tightening eligibility or cutting beneﬁts,”28 that is to say
strengthening the whip of the labour market;
2. Cost containment: the attempt to keep balanced budgets through austerity policies,
including deﬁcit reduction and tax moderation;
3. Recalibration: “reforms which seek to make contemporary welfare states more
consistent with contemporary goals and demands for social provision.”29
Obviously, as Pierson himself points out,30 this is “tricky territory analytically,” because
it may be very hard to “distinguish the impact of new ideas about how to do things,
or efforts to recalibrate errant programs, from simple cutbacks in provision.” The way
to go about trying to solve the dependent variable problem is: (1) to make sense, both
theoretically and empirically, of welfare state reform by carefully elucidating and
documenting what kind of changes are taking place; and (2) to explain cross-national
variation in change along the various dimensions of welfare state reform by trying to
uncover the causal forces and mechanisms that drive these processes.
Pierson has done much to improve the state of affairs and his proposals are also
helpful for the study of the welfare state as an independent variable. I propose to look
at welfare state reform as the independent variable and study the effects of reforms on the
political performance of advanced democracies. The deﬁnition of the “new politics” is
rather narrowly focused on the dimensions Pierson has outlined. But given the
enormous structural political transformation that the welfare state regimes have brought
about, it makes sense to consider the political consequences of cost containment,
recommodiﬁcation and restructuring (recalibration). In other words, I think it may be
useful to study the dimensions of Pierson’s dependent variable as ever so many
dimensions of the independent variable, a point to which I brieﬂy return in the
conclusion. First, however, some more needs to be said about “political consequences”
(legitimacy, stability, allegiance) as a dependent variable.
4. ALLEGIANCE AND LEGITIMACY
Many analysts readily mention legitimacy as perhaps the politically most advanta-
geous aspect of welfare state development, but somehow seem to eschew further
thorough inquiry in this area. In an interesting but largely forgotten chapter, Anthony
King analysed the welfare state as a bulwark of political stability and a cushion of
change: “If it did not exist, political conservatives would have to invent it.”31 In a recent
paper, Stein Kuhnle holds that “developed democratic welfare states are quite good at
making adjustments of public policies in such a way that the legitimacy of the system
can be preserved at the same time as new vitality and transformations in the economy
can be brought about.”32 The impressive comparative project on welfare and work in
the open economy of Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt33 even started from the
thesis that output-oriented legitimacy is implied in the good performance of the welfare
state in terms of work and welfare. There have also been more critical analyses. From
a Marxist point of view, Claus Offe deﬁned the welfare state’s role or function in terms
of a “peace formula” and the political solution to major societal contradictions.34 “The
increasing claims that are made on the state budget both by labour and capital (…) can
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only lead to unprecedented levels of public debt and to constant governmental efforts
to terminate or reduce welfare state programmes. Hence economic growth not only
becomes more costly in terms of the budgetary inputs required to promote it; it also
becomes more costly in terms of political legitimation.”35
Although there are perhaps good theoretical reasons to assume that the welfare
state has a positive impact on legitimacy and stability, there are equally good reasons to
ask critical questions. For instance, a recent comparative project on success and failure
in public governance36 ﬁnds that at the programmatic level there is no symmetry
between policy success or failure and political success or failure, so that there are cases
where the policy performance of a government is good, but the political reactions to
the government are adverse. In other words, legitimacy cannot be inferred from “good
performance,” because the conditions under which this does occur need to be carefully
speciﬁed. It is for this purpose that I introduce the concept of political allegiance.
Let us think of the welfare state as one of the crucial mechanisms linking a
government to the general public. Social policies substantiate the social and economic
security and well-being of the population, thereby conﬁrming or reinforcing political
allegiance. Let us assume that the welfare state provides economic and social security
and well-being. After the experience of crisis in the 1930s, the welfare state, or rather
the Keynesian welfare state, took job security very seriously and full employment in
some states came to mean the best way to obtain social security. The provision of
beneﬁts and services has been a major means to protect citizens against the risks inherent
to life itself (e.g. sickness, old age) and to life in a market economy (e.g. unemployment,
disability).
Security and well-being can be theorized as the major beneﬁts for national publics
offered by a government. For all political regimes (including welfare state regimes) it
holds that people are concerned about their material interests and their personal
security. What Gerard Alexander assumes to be the case for authoritarian and demo-
cratic regimes,37 also holds, mutatis mutandis, for welfare state regimes. First, citizens as
political subjects care about their well-being, wanting to protect and advance their
material and non-material interests. Second, they want to be reassured about their
security, ranging from a preference for the lowest possible risk of experiencing violence
to a desire for the most solid possible shelter against social and economic misfortune.
This, then, poses the following general question: under what conditions and to what
extent do publics (the ruled) accept and support decisions and actions of their
governments (the rulers) that seem to affect their well-being and security beyond their
direct control? The general answer is that they do so on the condition that this
guarantees or reinforces security (territorial, physical, social and economic) and well-be-
ing. This induces “allegiance,” formally deﬁned as the willingness of a national public
to approve of and to support the decisions made by a government, in return for a more
or less immediate and straightforward reward or beneﬁt to which the public feels
entitled on the basis of it having rendered approval and support.38
The “goods” of security/well-being and support are varied and manifold. Security
and well-being offered by a government can be territorial, physical, economic and
social. It must in principle be understood in the broadest possible sense and ranges from
issues of war and peace to economic (e.g. employment) and social (e.g. income
maintenance) security and well-being. Support offered by a public can be political,
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economic, social and civil and may range from various forms of social and political
participation and the willingness to pay taxes to the general inclination to observe the
law.
Allegiance is necessarily a relational concept and it is important to stress that in a
relation properly described by allegiance the implied rights and duties are correlative. It
is a dyadic relation where a subject has the right to be protected as well as the duty to
obey and support and where the ruler has both the right to decide and the duty to
provide security. Allegiance involves an exchange relation between two parties and the
currency of this bond as well as the guarantee of its stability consists of trust and security
rather than, for instance, the presence of a third party as a dispute resolver.
Allegiance describes the relation between the ruled and the ruler, between a
subject and a sovereign, between a public or citizenry and a government. The subject
conﬁdes in the ruler and the ruler in the subject. This remarkable conﬁdence is rooted
in a double expectation, because both parties in the relation anticipate a reward or
beneﬁt: protection, security and prosperity in return for submission and support, and
submission and support in return for protection, security and prosperity. Implied in this
relation between a public and a government is that when protection, security and
well-being are not guaranteed, then ultimately obedience and support decline, and
when support and obedience are not delivered, then ultimately the capacity to
rule—and therefore the capacity to deliver the goods—decreases.
The reasons I am elaborating the concept of allegiance here, is that I hold that
allegiance discloses what legitimacy tends to underexpose, namely the crucial condition
of security and well-being in the exchange relation between a ruler and the ruled. Let
me point to some important distinctive features and analytical advantages of allegiance.
Allegiance cannot be equated with legitimacy, because it is possible to think of a
legitimate government that is incapable of maintaining allegiance. Allegiance is much
more than appointing and afﬁrming political authority legitimately, for instance, in
elections. Allegiance also points to and touches upon civil obedience, for instance with
regard to paying taxes and contributions, or in a more general sense with regard to
obeying and implementing the law in return for the beneﬁt of being governed well.
The point is that all criteria of legitimacy may be met, yet allegiance may not
occur. A government may have acquired political power legally according to established
rules, the rules may be socially accepted and so may the political programme of the
government, and the ruled may have expressed their consent by having elected the
government.39 Nevertheless, allegiance may still be problematic, because the govern-
ment does not or cannot—possibly for reasons outside its power—deliver economic and
social security and an acceptable level of well-being.
Allegiance, as I understand it in comparison with legitimacy, has three important
connotations. First, legitimacy refers to both the rightfulness of the institution of
government and the actual government, whereas allegiance describes the relation be-
tween the actual rulers and the ruled. Legitimacy is—on the basis of the criteria
speciﬁed—a property of the decision-making processes and the political institutions,
while allegiance looks at the relation between rulers and ruled from the public’s point
of view. Secondly, allegiance presupposes the subject’s broad, although not necessarily
active, support for the actual ruler rather than a mere acquiescence with the system, an
express consent with the institution or a diffuse democratic consensus. Allegiance, Perry
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Anderson rightly argues, “bespeaks not civic participation but customary adhesion—
obedience in exchange for beneﬁts: Hobbes rather than Rousseau.”40 Finally, the
concept of allegiance has this connotation by virtue of it describing a beneﬁcial
exchange between the ruled and the actual ruler, where the ruler delivers security and
well-being. Allegiance presupposes a trade-off. In addition, because allegiance describes
the relation between the ruler and the ruled, it is ultimately a relation of power. A
proposition is that it makes sense for a ruler to invest in a power relation of allegiance
in order to be able to continue his rule.
One major example of “power investments” can be found in Esping-Andersen’s
analysis of Scandinavian social democracy,41 where the social citizenship state (rather
than the welfare state) was seen as one of the most important political bases of social
democracy. The socialists saw social citizenship as a goal but also as a means to power
mobilization. Universalist social policy created intra-class solidarity and helped build a
collective identity. Moreover, social policy liberated workers from the disciplinary whip
of the labour market and made them stronger vis-a`-vis employers. Finally, social policy
was to advance equality, a precondition for the other socialist goals. Esping-Andersen
expected “the long run political fate of social democratic labor movements to be
contingent on their ability to implement solidarity, decommodiﬁcation, and equality
through social legislation. Conversely, failure to implement a socialist alternative to
liberal or conservative reformism would weaken the capacity for working-class political
unity and social democratic power mobilization.”42
Another example is taken from my own work,43 in which I have analysed the
Christian democratic project of “social capitalism” as the medium and outcome of
power. Cross-class coalitions, both among the electorate and within the parties, have
distinguished Christian democratic parties. The cross-class appeal and the integration of
various social groups has been an important procedure for building cross-class coalitions.
This happened on the basis of exchange between groups, social compensation, and
maintaining extensive relations with afﬁliated social organizations. This analysis led to
the expectation that in a period of “permanent austerity,”44 the sources that once
provided the media of exchange for social capitalist coalitions (e.g. generous transfer
payments, subsidies) dry up as a result of which the “politics of mediation” comes to
an end, with detrimental effects on the power of Christian democracy. In addition to
secularization, Christian democracy’s major predicament is an effect of the incompati-
bility of the social and economic realities of the 1990s/early twenty-ﬁrst century and the
ill-adapted institutions of the welfare states to which the movements are politically
attached.
5. CONCLUSION AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Let me try to conclude by formulating four general questions and possible routes
for research.
1. Under what conditions and to what extent have different conﬁgurations of market,
state, family and civil society (the work and welfare regime of a nation) fostered
different “machineries” of political legitimacy? (Linking up with the regime litera-
ture.45)
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2. Under what conditions and to what extent do the effects of reform on political
legitimacy and allegiance vary according to different reform strategies, such as
recommodiﬁcation, cost containment and recalibration? (Following Pierson.46)
3. Under what conditions and to what extent are the central, advantageous feedback
mechanisms that reinforce the policy–legitimacy–allegiance dynamic in advanced
welfare states severed by endogenous and exogenous processes such as globalization,
European integration, demographic change and post-industrialization? (Incorporat-
ing “old theory,” the literature on path dependency47 and the literature on the
varying adjustment of welfare states to challenges and threats.48)
4. To what extent and under what conditions is the declining political function,
efﬁcacy and legitimacy of political actors, institutions and policies explained by the
inability to uphold welfare state regime-speciﬁc, self-reinforcing mechanisms of
continued power mobilization? (Revaluing and elaborating the power resources
approach to the welfare state and linking up with the path dependency literature.)
The ﬁndings of this paper suggest the following. Radical welfare state reform is likely
to cause political backlash. Even though programme-speciﬁc constituencies of clients
and professional interests are among the most effective guardians of the welfare state,
they are also the main source of political controversies over reform. The welfare state
may have important built-in institutional defences, yet any institutional logic of
adaptation is likely to have political consequences that critically affect the institutional
logic. Welfare states may still continue to be advantageous strategies of social and
political cohesion, but if state intervention cannot guarantee security and equity among
its citizens, social and political cohesion and political order may be in danger. Many of
the challenges discussed in the literature are likely to contribute to an environment in
which welfare and tax backlash is more likely and in which political support for the
welfare state is weakened accordingly, giving rise to electoral instability, ungovernabil-
ity, anti-politics sentiments and populist politics.
Assuming that the welfare state has been a crucial mechanism for generating and
maintaining political integration, democratic (output) legitimacy and political allegiance,
one could formulate two general propositions to guide further research. First, political
actors (parties, governments) are likely to formulate reform strategies that are aimed at
reinforcing political feedback mechanisms that are beneﬁcial to them in the short run,
for instance by protecting core political constituencies and shifting costs to weaker or
seemingly harmless (electoral) groups. Second, less electorally sensitive positive institu-
tional feedback loops (e.g. those working at systems level) run the risk of being
disrupted in the long run. In other words, welfare state reform strategies may generate
on the one hand a kind of short run political logic that may be electorally “efﬁcient” for
those political actors in power during more or less ﬁxed electoral cycles, but on the
other hand produce a systemic logic that is “inefﬁcient” for political integration,
legitimacy, stability and political allegiance in the long run.
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